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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900418-CA 
v. : 
MIGUEL ENRIQUE SALAS, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from conviction of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990), in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence, ruling that the stop of defendant's 
vehicle was legal and justified and finding that defendant 
voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle ? Because of 
the trial court's advantageous position in determining the 
factual basis for a motion to suppress, this Court will not 
reverse the trial court's factual evaluation unless its findings 
are clearly erroneous. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, in assessing the trial court's 
legal conclusions based upon the factual findings, this Court 
applies a correction of error standard. Id. 
2. Was the evidence at trial sufficient to support 
defendant's conviction? When a defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the 
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State 
v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 
S.Ct. 1837 (1990). 
3. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury on 
reasonable doubt? An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury 
instructions presents a question of law. Carpet Barn v. State of 
Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The trial court's 
legal conclusion is not accorded any deference and is reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 
at 1251. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Miguel Enrique Salas, was charged with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1990) (R. 7-8). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence 
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seized as a result of a consent search following a vehicle stop 
(R. 18-19). The trial court, after an evidentiary hearing, 
denied defendant's motion (R. 23, 98-101). Defendant was 
convicted of the charge after a jury trial and was sentenced to a 
term not to exceed five years (R. 94, 110-111). Defendant's 
sentence was stayed, and defendant was placed on probation for a 
period of 36 months (R. 110-111). Defendant timely filed a notice 
of appeal (R. 114-115). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 2, 1990, Officer William F. McCarthy of the 
West Valley City metro narcotics division received information 
from a confidential informant that defendant would be trafficking 
in drugs (transcript of hearing on motion to suppress 
[hereinafter f,TM] at 5, 11). Officer McCarthy was given a 
physical description of defendant, defendant's name, date of 
birth, age, where he worked, what time he was going to lunch and 
what type of vehicle he would be driving (T. 6). He was also 
told that defendant would have cocaine in his possession and that 
defendant would be selling the cocaine during his lunch hour 
(Id.) In addition, Officer McCarthy had a photograph of 
defendant (Id..). Special Agent Craig Englin of the U.S. 
Immigration Service and a back up unit of detectives were working 
with Officer McCarthy (Ld.). 
At approximately 11:00 a.m. Officer McCarthy checked 
the state computer to see if defendant had a valid driver's 
license and was unable to find a license under the name of Miguel 
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Salas (T. 4). He subsequently checked the names Miguel Enrique 
Salas, Enrique Miguel Salas, Enrique Leyva-Salas and Miguel 
Leyva-Salas but was still unable to find a valid Utah driver's 
license (T. 27). Just before stopping defendant, Officer 
McCarthy did a secondary license check using the Salt Lake City 
police dispatcher, and that check also revealed no license in the 
name of Miguel Salas (T. 5). 
At about noon defendant left his place of employment, 
Utah Metal, and drove south on North Beck Street (T. 7), Officer 
McCarthy stopped defendant, identified himself and asked for 
defendant's license (Id.)- Defendant was not able to produce a 
license from the wallet he was carrying, stating that he had left 
it in his other wallet at work (T. 7-8). Officer McCarthy asked 
defendant for the vehicle registration and was given the 
vehicle's title, which was under the names "Miguel/Janet or 
Jeanette Salas" (T. 47). The vehicle registration was later 
found in the glove box under the names "Miguel/Janet Salas" 
(Id.). Officer McCarthy believed that defendant was cited for 
driving without a license by one of the uniformed police officers 
who acted as backup at the scene, but he did not cite defendant 
himself because he did not carry a citation book (T. 17; 
transcript of trial [hereinafter "TA"] at 21). After defendant's 
arrest, he was booked under the name of Miguel Enrique Salas 
because that is the name he gave Officer McCarthy (T. 49).* 
1
 It is interesting to note that not only was defendant's 
case at the district court heard under the name of Miguel Enrique 
Salas, but all of defendant's appellate filings, including his 
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After defendant failed to produce a valid license, 
Officer McCarthy explained that he had stopped defendant for 
driving without a license and that he had information that 
defendant would be driving that car and possibly be in possession 
of cocaine (T.8). Officer McCarthy then asked defendant if he 
could search him and his vehicle (.Id. ) . At that point Officer 
McCarthy felt that defendant might be suffering from a language 
barrier and asked Agent Englin to translate the request into 
Spanish (T. 8-9). Defendant was informed that he did not have to 
consent to the search (T. 22-23, 30). However, he consented to 
the requested search, giving his response to the Spanish question 
in English, stating "go ahead" (T. 9, 31, 35). Both Officer 
McCarthy and Agent Englin observed that defendant was calm, 
cooperative and not apprehensive (T. 10, 31). After a search of 
two or three minutes, cocaine was found under the back seat, and 
defendant was arrested (T. 10, 26, 33). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the 
cocaine, defendant produced a valid Utah driver's license under 
the name of Miguel S. Leyva (R. 24-25, 41). At that time 
defendant stated that his immigration card was under the name of 
Salas (T. 44). 
notice of appeal, request for transcript, certification of 
transcripts, designation of record, docketing statement, 
appearance of co-counsel and motion for extension of time for 
preparation of appellant's brief were also under the name of 
Miguel Enrique Salas. It was not until defendant filed his 
appellate brief that he began using the name Miguel Enrique 
Salas-Leyva for the purpose of this case. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The stop of defendant's vehicle was not in violation of 
the fourth amendment because the officer who stopped defendant 
had reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating the law by 
driving without a valid license. Moreover, the traffic stop was 
not a pretext stop because the police officer did not use a legal 
justification to make the stop in order to search defendant for 
contraband. A hypothetical reasonable police officer would have 
stopped defendant for driving without a valid license. 
Defendant's failure to raise the issue of scope of 
detention at the trial court precludes him from raising that 
issue for the first time on appeal. 
Because the stop of defendant was proper, no police 
illegality tainted the voluntary consent that defendant gave to 
the search of his vehicle. 
Defendant fails to properly marshal the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict and then demonstrate that, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. If the 
evidence in the case is reviewed, the cumulative facts before the 
jury clearly support its guilty verdict. 
The trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was 
proper in the light of existing case law, as evidenced by both 
Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals decisions. The case 
of Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S.Ct. 328 (1990), has no applicability 




THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AFTER A TRAFFIC 
STOP AND CONSENSUAL SEARCH WAS PROPER AND DID 
NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. The police officer who stopped defendant 
had reasonable suspicion, based on 
articulable factsf to believe that defendant 
had violated the law. 
Defendant initially argues that Officer McCarthy lacked 
"reasonable articulable suspicion" based on objective facts that 
the defendant or one of the occupants of his vehicle had 
committed or was about to commit a crime when he stopped 
defendant for driving without a valid license (Br. of Appellant 
at 12). 
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle 
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a 
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has 
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic or 
equipment regulation or any applicable criminal law). Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662, 663 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 
1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v. 
Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986). In Utah, that 
constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion standard has been 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990), as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
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commit a public offense and may demand a 
name, address and explanation of his actions. 
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the 
degree of suspicion required for police to make an investigative 
stop, stating: 
[P]olice can stop and briefly detain a person 
for investigative purposes if the officer has 
a reasonable suspicion supported by 
articulable facts that criminal activity "may 
be afoot," even if the officer lacks probable 
cause. 
The officer, of course, must be able to 
articulate something more than an "inchoate 
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." 
rTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,] 27 [(1968)]. 
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal 
level of objective justification" for making 
the stop. INS v. Delqado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 
(1984). That level of suspicion is 
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
In the instant case Officer McCarthy had the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant had violated the 
law by driving without a valid license. He checked the state 
computer under five different possible variations of defendant's 
name, including the name defendant provided later at his booking 
and which has been used throughout this case and the name under 
which his vehicle was registered and titled (T. 4, 27, 47). In 
the absence of license verification on the state computer, 
Officer McCarthy also ran a secondary license check through the 
Salt Lake City police dispatcher (T. 5). That check also 
revealed no valid license under the name Miguel Salas. The valid 
Utah driver's license that defendant produced at the hearing on 
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his motion to suppress was under the name Miguel S. Leyva, a name 
he did not use on any other legal documents. Officer McCarthy 
diligently sought to verify a valid license under defendant's 
name, and his inability to find a license afforded reasonable 
suspicion for an investigative stop of defendant. If any party 
can be judged responsible for Officer McCarthy's failure to find 
evidence of defendant's license it must be defendant himself, who 
retained a license under a name he did not use. The trial court 
was correct in finding that the stop was justified (R. 100). 
Defendant cites several cases in support of his 
argument that Officer McCarthy lacked reasonable suspicion to 
stop defendant's vehicle. In the first, State v. Constantino, 
732 P.2d 125, 126 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court found that 
a police officer had validly stopped defendant because the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was 
driving with a revoked license and that an active warrant was out 
for defendant's arrest. Defendant suggests that the officer's 
affirmative confirmation of those facts in Constantino creates 
the standard from which to judge whether the stop in the instant 
case was justified (Br. of Appellant at 14). "Affirmative 
confirmation" of a crime is not the standard under which to 
assess the validity of an investigative traffic stop. In both 
Constantino and Gibson the Utah Supreme Court relied on the 
Delaware v. Prouse standard to uphold the investigative stop of a 
motorist when there was "articulable and reasonable suspicion 
that a motorist [was] unlicensed." State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 
-9-
at 126; State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d at 1304. As previously 
demonstrated, Officer McCarthy had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that defendant was unlicensed, and the investigative stop 
was valid. 
Defendant also cites to several cases to support the 
proposition that "the collective knowledge of all of the officers 
involved [in a stop] must provide sufficient grounds to justify a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. De 
Leon-Revna, 898 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir-), reh'g granted, 908 F.2d 
1229 (1990); Whitelv v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); United 
States v. Henslev, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). Although that assertion 
may be true, the State cannot see its applicability to the 
instant case. Both Whitelv and Henslev involved police officer 
reliance on bulletins from other police departments, where the 
Court assessed the factual basis of the underlying bulletin as 
opposed to the good faith of the officer relying on the bulletin. 
In De Leon-Revna, the court found that the police officer's 
negligence in erroneously transmitting the suspect vehicle's 
license plate number for a registration report resulted in a stop 
not supported by reasonable suspicion.2 In the instant case, 
Officer McCarthy did not rely on bulletins from other police 
agencies and did not act negligently in transmitting defendant's 
name for a driver's license check. In contrast, he transmitted 
2
 In De Leon-Revna, the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 
reheard the case on its own motion. Appellate briefs were 
resubmitted, and oral argument was heard on Jan. 23, 1991 by the 
court sitting en banc. As of the filing of this brief, no 
decision has been released. 
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defendant's correct name to the state computer and found no valid 
license. Defendant's reliance on the above-stated cases is 
misplaced. 
Finally, this Court also can affirm the trial court's 
ruling that defendant was properly stopped by finding that 
Officer McCarthy had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based 
upon the information he received concerning defendant's drug 
trafficking. See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) 
(an appellate court may affirm a decision on any proper grounds 
"even though the trial court assigned another reason for its 
ruling"). Although defendant's motion to suppress generally 
raised the issue of the officer's alleged lack of reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle, both parties largely 
confined their arguments to whether Officer McCarthy had 
reasonable suspicion to stop defendant's vehicle for a traffic 
infraction (R. 18). However, the evidence presented at the 
hearing on defendant's motion supports an investigative stop to 
confirm whether defendant was in possession of illicit drugs. 
In Alabama v. White, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (1990), the 
United States Supreme Court, applying a totality of the 
circumstances test (i.e. considering the quantity and quality of 
the information possessed by police), found that an anonymous 
tip, corroborated by police, exhibited sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify an investigative stop of the defendant's 
vehicle. J[d. at 2417. There, police received an anonymous tip 
that the defendant would be leaving a particular apartment, at a 
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particular time in a particular vehicle, that she would be going 
to a particular motel, and that she would be in possession of 
cocaine. Police went to the defendant's apartment, saw the 
vehicle matching the description they had, saw the defendant 
leave the building and enter the vehicle. She proceeded toward 
the motel by the most direct route, and the police stopped her 
just before she reached the motel. Thereafter, a consensual 
search revealed marijuana, and cocaine was also found after the 
defendant's arrest. In upholding the original investigative 
stop, the Court noted that an anonymous tip alone rarely provides 
reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. However, an 
anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police work, could 
furnish sufficient indicia of reliability for a stop based on 
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 2415-2416. See also Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (where the Court, in the context of 
probable cause, took into account facts known to police officers 
from personal observation, and, giving an anonymous tip the 
weight it deserved in light of that independent police work, 
upheld a police search of the defendants' home and car); State v. 
Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (where a concerned 
citizen's call to Crime Solvers, corroborated by independent 
police observation, provided sufficient probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 
833 (9th Cir. 1990); United v. Rodriguez, 835 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
In the instant case, the police were given information 
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by a confidential informant who had not been previously used, 
although the record does not indicate that the informant was 
anonymous (T. 11). The police received a physical description of 
defendant, his name, date of birth, age, were told where he 
worked, what time he would go to lunch, the type of vehicle he 
would be driving and that he would have cocaine (T. 4,6). 
Officer McCarthy also had obtained a photograph of defendant (T. 
6). The officers went to defendant's place of employment, saw 
him leave the building at about noon, enter his vehicle and drive 
away (T. 6,7)• He appeared to be the same person who was in the 
photograph (T. 7). Considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the Alabama v. White and Illinois v. Gates tip 
plus independent corroborative police investigation standard is 
clearly met in the instant case. The investigative stop of 
defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion that he was 
engaged in drug trafficking. 
B. The stop of defendant's vehicle did not 
constitute an unconstitutional pretext stop. 
Defendant also claims that the investigative stop was 
an unconstitutional pretext stop, which "occurs when the police 
use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a 
person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated 
serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to support a stop." United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 
1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988). 
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796 P2d 684, 689 
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(Utah 1990), this Court set forth the following standard for 
determining whether an unconstitutional pretext stop has 
occurred: 
[I]f a hypothetical reasonable police officer 
would not have stopped the driver for the 
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding 
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, 
the stop is unconstitutional. 
754 P.2d at 979. See also State v. Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable officer would have 
made a stop under the circumstances, not whether the officer 
could have made the stop. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 97 8 (relying on 
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986)). The test 
is an objective one, and the "subjective intent of the police 
officer is irrelevant." Id., at 977-78; Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515, 
1517. 
A problem with pretext stop analysis is illustrated by 
both Arroyo and Smith. Neither case clearly indicates what 
evidentiary basis is necessary to a determination of whether "a 
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the 
circumstances confronting him or her, would have stopped [the 
defendant] to issue a [traffic citation]." Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 
(quoting Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978). This evidentiary difficulty 
is well illustrated in the Guzman opinion, where the Tenth 
Circuit declined, on the basis of an inadequate record, to rule 
on the validity of the trial court's conclusion that a pretext 
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stop had occurred, stating: 
In this case, the district court conducted a 
subjective inquiry, which we conclude was 
inappropriate. The only information in the 
record reflecting general police practice was 
apparently based upon the district court's 
prior experience with this officer rather 
than testimony about general practices. We 
have neither the evidence nor the necessary 
findings about objective reasonableness to 
permit us to apply the appropriate 
[objective] test. 
864 F.2d at 1518. Neither Arroyo nor Smith made any reference to 
evidence regarding general police practices. Arroyo only alluded 
to the officer's testimony that lie issued three or four citations 
for "following too closely" in 1987. Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155 n. 
2. Apparently, no evidence was presented to the trial court about 
the general practice of police officers in this state or in the 
particular officer's territory with respect to issuing citations 
for that traffic offense. Smith made no reference to any 
evidence to support the conclusion that the signaling violation 
there was one for which officers regularly issue citations. In 
addition, neither case clearly articulated what weight is to be 
given general police practice in evaluating the circumstances 
surrounding a stop. i 
Defendant suggests that this Court rely on the police 
officer's subjective state of mind as one of the circumstances 
to be considered in assessing whether a reasonable officer would 
have made the stop (Br. of Appellant at 19). To do so would be 
to gut the fundamental basis for pretext stop analysis and 
thereby render the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard 
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obsolete.3 Moreover, it would make the determination of the 
validity of the stop much more difficult to evaluate by forcing 
courts to look at subjective underlying motivation, an analysis 
that this Court has thus far repeatedly refused to adopt. See, 
3
 A number of federal and state courts have rejected the 
pretext analysis adopted in Sierra and have limited the inquiry 
to whether the police had either reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to justify the seizure (i.e. a stop or an arrest). See, 
e.g. , United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990) (which 
specifically rejects the pretext test adopted in United States v. 
Smith and United States v. Guzman); State v. Olaiz, 100 Or.App. 
380, 786 P.2d 734 (Or. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 
1990). The inquiry does not go beyond that point to ask whether 
a police officer would have effected the seizure under the 
circumstances, ibid. "'[SJo long as the police are doing no more 
that they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, 
[the resulting stop or] arrest is constitutional.'" Cummins, 920 
F.2d at 501 (quoting United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 
(7th Cir. 1989) (relying upon United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 
1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (M[T]he Court has told us that where 
police officers are objectively doing what they are legally 
authorized to do . . . the results of their investigations are 
not to be called in question on the basis of any subjective 
intent with which they acted.")). 
This approach is most consistent with the well settled 
principle that "the fact that the officer does not have the state 
of mind which is hypothecated [sic] by the reasons which provide 
the legal justification for the officer's action does not 
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justify that action." Scott v. United states, 436 
U.S. 128, 138 (1978). "The Court's language leaves little doubt 
that 'the officer's actual state of mind at the time of the 
challenged action was taken[]' is of no significance in 
determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has 
occurred." Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501 (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 
472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the 
"usual police practices" approach, inherent in the pretext 
analysis of Sierra, is a far reaching check on the discretion of 
individual police officers not firmly grounded in the United 
States Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence. "The 
[Supreme] Court . . . has never indicated that the discretionary 
exercise of the arrest [or detention] power, a power that is 
contingent upon a prior determination or probable cause [or 
reasonable suspicion], is constitutionally significant." Trigg, 
878 F.2d at 1041. 
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e.g., Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 
771 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155; Smith, 
781 P.2d at 883. If this Court continues to apply the pretext 
stop analysis to assess whether the fourth amendment has been 
violated, it must also adhere to an objective analysis. As the 
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit stated: 
This test properly preserves the Supreme 
Court's requirement of an objective inquiry 
into Fourth Amendment activity, see Maryland 
v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 
2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Scott 
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 
S.Ct. 1717, 1723-24, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), 
and provides meaningful judicial review of 
discretionary police action. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517. 
In the instant case, Officer McCarthy had objective 
justification for stopping defendant to determine whether he was 
driving without a valid license, a clear violation of Utah 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (Supp. 1990). Although the 
record is rather scant concerning general police policy regarding 
citations for driving without a valid license, on cross 
examination Officer McCarthy was asked whether it was usual 
procedure to issue a citation for driving without a license. He 
responded that he believed defendant had been cited for the 
offense (T. 17). Defendant has not produced any evidence showing 
that police officers do not normally cite for this offense. When 
alleging that a pretext stop has occurred, a defendant should 
bear the burden of proving that allegation, once the State has 
born its original burden of showing the constitutionality of the 
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stop (i.e. that the police officer had reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to believe that the defendant was violating the 
law). See State v. Loveqren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10 (which 
suggests that, when alleging a pretext stop, a defendant bears 
some burden in showing that a hypothetical reasonable officer 
would not have made a particular traffic stop); see also United 
States v. Lewis, 910 F.2d 1367, 1371 (7th Cir. 1990). Applying 
an objective standard, a hypothetical police officer would have 
stopped a person for driving without a license, and the stop of 
defendant for that traffic infraction was not a pretext stop that 
violated the fourth amendment. The trial court's conclusion that 
the stop was legal and justified is correct and should not be 
disturbed (R.100). 
C. Defendant's failure to raise the issue of 
the scope of a traffic stop at the trial 
court bars him from raising the issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
Defendant argues that police officers exceeded the 
permissible scope of a traffic stop in violation of the fourth 
amendment. However, defendant did not raise or develop that 
issue in his motion to suppress. Failure to raise issues below 
normally bars a defendant from raising the issue for the first 
time on appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. 
App.), rev'd on other grounds, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). This Court has 
applied this principle of appellate review in the context of 
fourth amendment challenges, stating: 
[W]here a defendant fails to assert a 
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particular ground for suppressing unlawfully 
obtained evidence in the trial court, an 
appellate court will not consider that ground 
on appeal. 
State v, Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)). In Webb, this 
Court noted the Carter court's reliance on State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 
48 (Utah), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981), in which the Utah 
Supreme Court pointed out that suppression motions should be 
supported by precise averments, not conclusory generalizations, 
and held that, in the absence of special circumstances, the 
appellate court will not rule on available grounds not addressed 
in the trial court. Webb, 790 P.2d at 78. Finally, this Court, 
again quoting Carter and Lee, stated: 
[T]o entertain the point now would be to 
sanction the practice of withholding 
positions that should properly be presented 
to the trial court but which may be withheld 
for purposes of seeking a reversal on appeal 
and a new trial or dismissal. 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 78 (quoting Carter, 707 P.2d at 661, and Lee, 
633 P.2d at 53). That reasoning is compelling, and this Court 
should continue to adhere to the requirement that suppression 
issues be raised at the trial court. 
D. Defendant voluntarily consented to the 
search of his vehicle, and that consent was 
not preceded by any police misconduct or 
illegal action. 
Defendant finally argues both that defendant's consent 
was tainted by a prior police illegality, in accordance with the 
test articulated in State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990), and that the trial court erred in finding that defendant's 
-19-
consent to search his vehicle was voluntary. The first argument 
can be summarily addressed. Arroyo applies only to those cases 
in which consent is given following some police misconduct and is 
intended to prevent law enforcement officials from exploiting 
their prior illegalities to obtain consent. In the instant case, 
there was no illegality by the police prior to defendant's 
consent to the search of his vehicle. Police officers properly 
stopped defendant based on reasonable suspicion that he was 
driving without a valid driver's license or transporting illicit 
drugs. Consequently, Arroyo does not apply, and defendant's 
reliance upon it is misplaced. 
Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in 
finding that he voluntarily consented to the search of his 
vehicle must also fail. As the United States Supreme Court 
stated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), it is 
"well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions 
to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a 
search that is conducted pursuant to [valid] consent." .Id., at 219 
(citations omitted). For consent to be valid it must be freely 
and voluntarily given. .Id. at 222. This Court has likewise 
recognized the voluntary consent exception to fourth amendment 
requirements. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, P.2d (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d at 980. To determine whether consent to search was 
voluntary, a totality of the circumstances test is applied to 
ensure that the consent was in fact voluntary and not the result 
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of "duress or coercion, express or implied." Marshall, 791 P.2d 
at 887 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The State carries 
the burden of proof in showing that a defendant's consent was 
voluntary. United States v. Mendenhall, 412 U.S. 544, 557 
(1980). Voluntariness of consent is a question of fact, and an 
appellate court deferentially reviews a trial court's finding of 
voluntary consent and will not reverse absent clear error. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 
437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Marshall, 791 P.2d at 880; State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 82; State v. Sterqer, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 
33, 34 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Grovier, 155 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 37, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).But see State v. Bobo, 149 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 67, 69 (Utah Ct. App. (1990) (voluntariness of consent 
is a mixed question of fact and law). 
In the instant case, defendant was asked if he 
consented to the search in both English and Spanish (T. 8, 9, 31, 
35). He was informed that he did not have to consent to the 
search (T. 22-23, 30). Both Officer McCarthy and Agent Englin 
testified that defendant said, "go ahead" (T. 9, 31). Defendant 
stated that he did not consent to the search (T. 43). However, 
it is the province of the trial court, acting as the trier of 
fact, to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and its 
determination that defendant's consent was voluntary was not 
clearly erroneous and should not be overturned. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed 
to show that he actually or constructively possessed the cocaine 
found in the back seat of his vehicle. The power of this Court 
to review a jury verdict challenged on sufficiency of evidence is 
"quite limited." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). The evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from 
it, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990). Accordingly, this Court requires 
defendants challenging the sufficiency of evidence on appeal to 
marshal all the evidence in support of the jury's verdict and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
verdict. Moore, 802 P.2d at 738-39 (adopting the "marshal the 
evidence" standard for use in appeals from jury verdicts in 
criminal cases where sufficiency of evidence is at issue). 
In the instant case, defendant has made a nominal 
effort to marshal the evidence in favor of the jury verdict but 
fails to cite to any specific evidence, such as the testimonies 
of Officer McCarthy and Agent Englin, that support that verdict 
(Br. of Appellant at 32). Moreover, defendant has not even 
attempted to demonstrate that, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence is still 
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insufficient to support the verdict. Id,, at 738. On that basis 
alone, this Court should reject defendant's insufficiency 
argument. 
However, should this Court entertain the argument, the 
evidence still supports the jury's verdict. A conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance requires proof that a 
defendant "knowingly and intentionally • . . possess or use a 
controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990). 
"Actual physical possession presupposes knowing and intentional 
possession. However, actual physical possession is not necessary 
to convict a defendant of possession of a controlled substance 
(citation omitted). A conviction may also be based on 
constructive possession . . . . 'where the contraband is subject 
to [defendant's] dominion and control.'" State v. Fox, 7 09 P.2d 
316, 318-19 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 
74 (Utah 1981). To prove constructive possession of a drug the 
State must demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the defendant 
and the drug to permit an inference that the defendant had the 
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug. 
Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. 
In the instant case, Officer McCarthy testified to the 
fact that a confidential informant had notified the police that, 
during the lunch hour, defendant would be in a particular vehicle 
and delivering cocaine (TA. 11).A He was also given the license 
A
 At trial defendant objected to Officer McCarthy's 
testimony concerning the informant's information on the basis of 
hearsay, but his objection was overruled (TA. 11). Defendant now 
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number of the vehicle (TA. 12). When defendant left his place of 
employment at about noon, he was followed and stopped (TA. 13). 
Defendant was asked to produce a license and vehicle 
registration. Although he was unable to produce a valid license 
or registration, he did produce a title to the vehicle in the 
name of Jeanette/Miguel Salas (jCd.). After defendant consented 
to a search of his vehicle, cocaine was found behind the back 
seat (TA. 16). Agent Englin testified to the same events as 
Officer McCarthy but also stated that defendant had told him, " 
they put it [the cocaine] there" (TA. 36, 38, 40, 51). Although 
two other passengers were in the vehicle with defendant, 
defendant produced no evidence to rebut the clear inference that 
the cocaine was at least constructively possessed by defendant. 
The vehicle was owned and driven by defendant, and cocaine was 
found behind the rear seat. 
In further support of the jury's verdict, the jury 
instructions properly apprised the jury of the elements of the 
offense of possession of a controlled substance (R. 80; 
instruction 13) and the meaning of "unlawful," "intentionally," 
and "knowingly" (R. 81-81; instructions 14, 15,16). The jury was 
also instructed concerning "constructive possession" (R. 84; 
asserts that the trial court's action was improper, but he offers 
no analysis, does not show that the statements were offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted and does not assert that 
the alleged impropriety was substantive (i.e. that it affected 
the outcome of the trial). See In re Estate of Hock, 655 P. 2d 
1111 (Utah 1982); Utah R. Evid. 103, 801. Eecause defendant has 
failed to support an argument by legal analysis or authority, 
this Court should decline to consider it. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984). 
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instruction 17) and the fact that the mere presence of a 
defendant at the scene of a crime was not, in and of itself, 
evidence of his guilt (R. 85; instruction 18). 
The unrebutted evidence presented at trial provided a 
sufficient nexus between defendant and the cocaine found in his 
vehicle. The jury instructions properly apprised the jury of the 
law regarding possession of a controlled substance. Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is 
clearly sufficient to support defendant's conviction. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON REASONABLE DOUBT 
Defendant asserts that the reasonable doubt instruction 
submitted to the jury was inadequate in light of the recent 
United States Supreme Court, decision, Cage v. Louisiana. Ill 
S.Ct. 328, 330 (1990). This Court has previously approved the 
precise instruction given in this case after having considered 
the directives of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 11A 
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), and State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1989). State v. Pederson, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 ( Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (a copy of the instruction is attached hereto as Addendum 
A). 
However, defendant contends that the jury instructions 
in Cage v. Louisiana and the instant case are so similar that the 
instruction must necessarily be construed to be invalid. In 
support, defendant asserts that both instructions "have a 
presumption of innocence clause," both require acquittal if the 
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state does not prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
both state that reasonable doubt need not be proven to an 
absolute certainty, both define a reasonable doubt as one based 
on reason and one that a reasonable person would entertain, and 
both disallow a reasonable doubt to be one that is merely 
fanciful, imaginary or wholly speculative (Brief of Appellant at 
37 n.9). However, none of these aspects of the instruction were 
found to be constitutionally defective in Cage, and defendant's 
own jury instruction also includes each of these clauses (a copy 
of defendant's proposed instruction is attached hereto as 
Addendum B). Defendant does not assert that his proposed 
instruction is defective pursuant to Cage, and his skewed attack 
on the instruction given by the trial court must fail. 
Cage condemned the combined use of phrases equating a 
reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty," "actual substantial 
doubt," and "moral certainty." The combination of this 
terminology, even when viewed in the context of the instructions 
as a whole, allowed for a "finding of guilt based on a degree of 
proof below that required by the Due Process Clause." Cage, 111 
S. Ct. at 329-30. But, these terms were not used in defendant's 
case. Therefore, Cage has no applicability to the instant 
instruction. Accord State of Idaho v. Rhoades, 1991 WL 15607 
(Idaho Feb. 13, 1991); Lord v. State of Nevada, 1991 WL 13535 
(Nev. Feb. 7, 1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED this y^ day of April, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
QMr^iJcar*-^ 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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INSTRUCTION NO. / 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 




A defendant is presumed innocent unless that defendant is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt* If you have a reasonable 
doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal* The burden is 
upon the state to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The state's evidence must eliminate all reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does not require proof to 
an absolute certainty. 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and 
« 
women would have, and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in this case. Depending upon the circumstances, 
possibilities may create a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, 
reasonable doubt cannot be a doubt that is merely fanciful or 
imaginary, or is based upon a wholly speculative possibility. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who 
are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and eliminates all 
resonable doubt. A determination that a defendant has committed a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the application of reason, 
impartiality and common sense. You must have greater assurance of 
the correctness of such a decision than you would normally have in 
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life. The reason 
for this standard is that you cannot undo your verdict once you have 
ut'rij,^ 
In your personal life, on the other hand, you may be able to undo or 
modify the consequences of decisions you make. 
cooo: 
